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Abstract—There is an increasing demand for access to the 
national airspace system (NAS) by new entrants such as 
unmanned aircraft systems (UASs) and space vehicles. The need 
is driving the research into the development of a ubiquitous 
surveillance framework. A framework where all means of 
aircraft position tracking systems, both cooperative and non-
cooperative, would be correlated and made available to all NAS 
users. The architecture of an envisioned surveillance system was 
the focus of a recent Volpe National Transportation Systems 
Center research activity. In this work, the term “Framework” 
is used to characterize an operational environment that forms 
the context for future UAS operations. Within this framework, 
the use of all existing and future surveillance technologies is 
envisioned. Included would be all airspace locations; including 
coverage for airspace not under surveillance today. While these 
surveillance means and methods of air traffic control may 
currently constrain new entrant operations, they also provide 
the opportunity for the plethora of enabling technological 
capabilities with associated policies and procedures that can 
result in the safe, orderly and efficient operation. The focus of 
this paper is to survey and identify surveillance technologies to 
support the integration of new entrants in the NAS, and how 
those technologies can be aggregated. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The two chief surveillance targets in the NAS are vehicles 
and meteorological phenomena. For over half a century, these 
targets have been surveilled by surveillance technologies, 
systems, and infrastructure, which have been steadily 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20180003477 2019-08-31T15:55:50+00:00Z
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increasing in capability and diversity. There has also been a 
growing diversity, particularly in recent years, of vehicles 
types in the NAS. Successfully integrating these new entrants 
into the NAS is an on-going challenge, and one requirement 
is to meet their surveillance needs. 
This paper first examines the new entrants, and a sampling of 
their surveillance needs. We next survey the wide range of 
surveillance assets in the NAS, including both legacy and 
emerging systems and technologies. We then examine how 
these surveillance assets can meet the growing surveillance 
needs, and explore possible system architectures. 
 
2. FUTURE SURVEILLANCE NEEDS 
This section surveys a sampling of trends in the NAS and the 
surveillance challenges and requirements they pose. This 
section examines new entrants in the NAS, space vehicles, 
Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) Traffic Management, 
counter UAS, and security. 
New Entrants 
The introduction and integration of new entrants into the 
national airspace system (NAS) is likely to pose new 
surveillance requirements. The so-called new entrants, 
includes a range of non-traditional vehicles and mission 
types, including unmanned aircraft systems (UASs), and 
space vehicles. These categories include a wide diversity of 
sub categories. For example, UASs may fly cargo delivery 
missions using point-to-point or round robin routes, and 
UASs may fly agricultural, search-and-rescue, and border 
patrol missions using orbiting, loitering, and grid patterns. 
Some of these mission profiles are currently being flown by 
manned aircraft, but the number of operations is expected to 
increase dramatically with UASs due to the lower cost of 
operations. In other cases, entirely new mission types are 
likely to emerge. In all cases, UAS performance 
characteristics are likely to differ from the manned vehicle 
counterparts (if indeed there is any counterpart). UASs often 
have lower thrust-to-weight ratios and lower overall 
performance compared to traditional manned aircraft. But the 
lack of human occupants and associated supplies could also 
enable greater thrust-to-weight ratios, and relaxed 
acceleration constraints. This, along with the tendency 
toward lower Reynolds Number, especially for small UASs, 
can lead to faster, more responsive vehicle maneuvers, with 
tighter turns, with faster initiation and termination rolls, faster 
accelerations and decelerations, and steeper climb and 
descent segments. In addition to these performance 
differences, other UASs have vertical takeoff and landing, as 
well as hovering, capabilities. 
This performance diversity of the new entrants may challenge 
existing surveillance assets. For instance, ground-based 
radars use an alpha-beta tracking filter, tuned for 
conventional aircraft. Furthermore, the new entrants present 
a wide diversity of operating regimes. They may loiter for 
days at a time. They may operate at extremely high altitudes, 
far above conventional aircraft. They may operate at very low 
altitudes, near or in urban areas and city scape clutter. They 
may operate near surface terrain and obstacles. All of these 
conditions are outside the operating regimes that traditional 
surveillance assets were designed for. 
Beyond diverse performance and operating regimes, the new 
entrants also present diverse cross sections and geometries. 
UASs can be small, weighing only a few tens of pounds, or 
less. These small targets, even if within the surveillance asset 
field of view, may otherwise be undetectable. Other UASs 
may have several rotors, presenting a non-traditional, 
dynamic cross section and geometry. 
Finally, the entrants present a surveillance challenge simply 
by virtue of the large numbers, which are anticipated. 
Currently the number of instrument flight rules flights in the 
national airspace system per day is counted in the tens of 
thousands. With the coming new entrants, that number could 
increase to the hundreds of thousand, or more. 
Space Vehicles 
The retirement of the Space Shuttle fleet in 2011 has led to 
the development of a new generation of commercial space 
vehicles to lift cargo, supplies, scientific missions, etc., to 
orbit, and eventually even astronauts to the International 
Space Station. Examples of the trajectory types of these 
emerging space vehicles include: vertical takeoff using an 
expendable launch vehicle, horizontal takeoff and landing 
using a reusable launch vehicle, air launch from a mothership, 
vertical takeoff with an RLV where the booster stage is flown 
back to a designated landing site, and capsule reentry into 
either sea- or land-based sites. Therefore, as with UASs, 
space vehicles are expected to use a wide range of trajectories 
to accomplish their missions. Furthermore, space vehicles 
operate at a much greater range of speeds, from a standing 
start at liftoff to significantly higher speeds than conventional 
aircraft. 
At this point in time, however, space vehicle operations in the 
NAS still occur relatively infrequently and within special 
activity airspace. Therefore, there has been little in mitigating 
the impact of these operations on the NAS. But the increase 
of commercial space vehicle operations, NAS operations and 
users will be negatively impacted at much higher rates. 
Delays, reroutes, increased flight time and increased fuel 
burn will all occur as a result. NAS inefficiencies arise from 
the need to assume the failure of a space vehicle during 
launch or reentry. NAS operations and flights must be make 
highly conservative plans, and avoid the airspace that might 
be impacted by such failures. With the increase of space 
vehicle operations, NAS users and service providers will 
need to develop new procedures, technologies, and 
infrastructure to adjust and maintain efficiency. One such 
infrastructure enhancement is improved surveillance to make 
up for current shortfalls. 
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Unmanned Aircraft System Traffic Management (UTM) 
UTM is an Air Navigation Service Provider (ANSP) system 
that services small UAS operations in otherwise uncontrolled 
airspace. Small UAS vehicles and missions are diverse, 
including border surveillance, public safety, agriculture, 
disaster response, mapping, entertainment and news 
reporting, cargo delivery, meteorological, and scientific. 
Most of these diverse missions call for relatively short flights 
at low altitude, measured in hundreds of feet above ground 
level. This poses unique surveillance requirements and 
challenges. 
Compared with traditional aviation, small UASs operating at 
low altitude are impacted more significantly by the wind. 
Typically, the most important weather phenomenon to the 
average UAS flight is wind. A strong wind can exceed the 
small UAS airspeed, so it is unable to return to base. For some 
small UASs accounting for the wind may be crucial to 
achieving a successful mission. Key drivers are the wind 
speed, and the wind spatial and temporal dynamics. Those 
dynamics are short and fast, respectively, compared to wind 
patterns above the planetary boundary layer. Furthermore, 
those dynamics are (i) far more influenced by the local, 
unique, surface structures and features, and (ii) likely to be 
chaotic. These factors have implications for the required wind 
measurement and forecast accuracy. For instance, strong 
winds or gusty-ness can significantly affect the UAS power 
budget, as it fights the wind to maintain station. Winds can 
cut the UAS duration by half. Similarly, the presence of 
turbulence increases control action, and so reduces battery 
power. One solution for wind measurement is crowd sourcing 
the UAS population, though in-situ wind measurement for 
small UASs can be challenging. 
In addition to wind, similar problems exist for other 
meteorological factors which are important for small UASs, 
including heavy rain affecting electronics, weight, propeller 
efficiency, and visibility; temperature affecting batteries 
(lithium batteries area quite temperature sensitive, and both 
hot and very cold temperatures cause draw down); thermal 
effects causing rapid altitude changes of hundreds of feet; 
lightning causing radio frequency interference, microbursts, 
and hail. 
In meteorological forecasting at low altitudes, the terrain is a 
dominant factor. There are also seasonal effects, for example, 
terrain that is lush with vegetation has a different impact on 
low-altitude weather versus terrain that is dry and brown. 
Traditionally in aviation, ceiling and visibility products are 
associated with an airport. But with UASs they are needed 
wherever the UAS is operating. Visibility adds a reverse 
meaning for UASs. In addition to the slant range from the 
vehicle, visibility is also a measure of the slant range from 
the ground to the vehicle. In the latter case, one solution for 
measuring visibility is to exploit the large number of cameras 
that are common in public places. Image processing 
techniques would use edge detection of distant objects to 
infer visibility. 
Convection is also a challenge because convection forecast 
accuracy generally improves with scale. A hurricane is easier 
to forecast than a 10 km cell. UASs require small-scale 
convection forecasts. 
In addition to weather, traffic, terrain, and obstacles can also 
pose surveillance challenges. These challenges include high 
density traffic, complex (unordered) traffic structure, 
interaction with manned operations such as crop dusters, 
small vehicles with low radar and optical cross sections, and 
so forth. While ground based tracking radars in the airport 
terminal area provide surveillance tracking data with 
approximately a 5.5 second period, t the required small UAS 
tracking surveillance is now considered to be one second. 
UASs operating within major cities pose particular 
surveillance challenges for several different reasons, 
including highly dynamic winds which can be high speed in 
given locations, complicated wind modeling and forecasting, 
vehicle stability, navigation, steering, separation from high 
value objects such as buildings, surveillance of various types 
of otherwise unmapped, dangerous objects (power lines, 
scaffolding, clothes lines, etc.), communications with 
substantial multipath, and so forth. 
As alluded to above, one solution to these various 
surveillance challenges may be to use information from UAS 
operations; that is, crowd-sourcing techniques. The UTM 
concept of operations calls for the sharing of traffic, weather, 
and terrain information between the UTM and UAS services 
and the UAS operations. The UTM eco-system facilitates this 
sharing of information between UAS operations. This 
paradigm may be critical to address the inherent limitations 
of surveillance of non-cooperative manned vehicles, low 
altitude weather forecasts, and vehicle obstruction maps. But 
this will bring with it many challenges, including: 
 Calibration is required to avoid bias errors, but how do 
you calibrate thousands of sensors distributed on diverse 
UASs? 
 The means for verifying and validating this non-
traditional information will have to be established. 
 Sensor mounting (UAVs have various shapes and 
multiple propellers causing unique air flow geometries 
which may impact the sensor measurements). 
 UAVs have limited power and weight restrictions so 
usually only limited sensors can be accommodated 
 Collected data will be very limited in time and space. 
Should it be used in a synoptic low altitude forecast 
product? That may be challenging because the 
observations are clustered in time and space. Or 
mesoscale or local forecasts could be constructed, 
specifically for UASs (e.g., forecasts targeted to 
agricultural areas, power lines, etc.). 
 An infrastructure is needed for collecting the 
observations. 
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Counter UAS 
Small UASs are restricted to designated airspaces and pose a 
surveillance challenge when they depart those regions. 
Unknown vehicles and their operators are subject to some 
type of enforcement or immediate mitigation action. For 
example, small UASs detected near an airport within 
controlled airspace where its flight is restricted must be 
detected and intercepted. This likely requires a 
comprehensive multilayer security approach. 
Security 
There are various security threats to aviation in general, and 
surveillance systems such as ADS-B in particular. 
Surveillance systems are, in general, cyber-physical systems 
(CPSs). In addition to their cyber and physical components, 
they are the target of both cyber and physical threats. Both 
types of threats may target both types of components, making 
for a two-by-two threat matrix. 
ADS-B In is particularly vulnerable to these threats. For 
example, it can be spoofed (fooling receiver with a false 
signal), and jammed (corruption of a true signal). Developers 
have proposed solutions for many of its vulnerabilities. For 
instance, one approach is to use a platoon of nearby flights 
that transmit ADS-B information between themselves, 
enabling them to discriminate false ADS-B transmissions. 
But such solutions represent significant system 
modifications.  
 
Table 1. Surveillance systems. 
 
 
3. SOURCES OF SURVEILLANCE 
UAS surveillance as considered in this paper includes 
tracking the location of aircraft in the air and on the ground, 
and tracking threats to aircraft. Threats to aircraft in the air 
include other aircraft, weather, birds, ground obstacles, and 
terrain. Threats to aircraft on the ground include other 
aircraft, weather, ground obstacles, ground vehicles, people, 
and animals. 
Historically aircraft operators and Air Traffic Control (ATC) 
have depended upon legacy ground-installed and aircraft-
installed surveillance technologies for safe air traffic 
operations. These legacy surveillance technologies often 
support other national needs including border protection. The 
introduction of UAS operations has created new surveillance 
challenges related to lower altitude operations, smaller cross 
section aircraft, and limited avionics SWaP and airborne 
antennae dimensions. The UAS surveillance challenges have 
stimulated a search for new aviation surveillance 
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technologies to address legacy surveillance technology gaps, 
and to develop concepts to aggregate and synthesize all 
available surveillance, to distribute to a broad aviation 
stakeholder community.  
Legacy and future surveillance technologies are summarized 
in Table 1, and described in more detail in the following 
sections. Surveillance systems are grouped by legacy ground-
installed surveillance technologies, legacy aircraft installed 
surveillance technologies, and future surveillance 
technologies. 
The Spectrum Efficient National Surveillance Radar 
(SENSR) program will replace many of the existing 
surveillance radar systems with a common system or family 
of systems, while freeing valuable spectrum for other uses.  
Legacy cooperative aircraft-installed systems depend upon 
position, navigation, and timing (PNT) systems. Legacy PNT 
systems include GPS, inertial navigations systems, and 
DME/DME/IRU systems. GPS is considered vulnerable to 
system loss, jamming, and spoofing. Future PNT systems 
under consideration by the FAA intended to backup GPS are 
Enhanced DME (eDME) and a DME Hybrid system which 
modifies ADS-B RTs to enable 1090/UAT ranging. 
Legacy Ground-installed Surveillance Technologies 
Ground-installed RADAR systems. Legacy ground-installed 
surveillance RADARs include short range primary RADARs 
associated with Air Traffic Control Towers (ATCT’s) and 
Terminal Radar Approach Control Facilities (TRACON’s), 
long range primary RADARs associated with Air Route 
Traffic Control Centers (ARTCCs) and border surveillance 
facilities, secondary RADARs paired with primary 
RADARs, tethered aerostat RADARs, weather RADARs, 
and airport surface detection RADARs 
Ground-installed radar systems are summarized in the 
Table 2, and described in more detail in the following 
sections.
 
Table 2. Ground-installed surveillance radar systems. 
 
 
Each radar system includes electronic equipment and major 
infrastructure at the radar antenna site (typically a modular 
tower, concrete/masonry building, secure perimeter fencing, 
grounding system, and uninterruptable power system) plus 
remote electronic equipment at distant operational facilities, 
including dedicated displays, common workstations, 
telecommunications and provision for uninterruptable power 
at the remote sites. 
Short range radar surveillance systems. The FAA has 
developed and deployed an increasing more capable series of 
short range radars designated as ASR (Airport Surveillance 
Radars). The military has deployed a derivative series of 
radars designated by AN/GPN. These radar systems are 
located on or near major airports and supply primary radar 
signals in all weather conditions to Air Traffic Control 
(ATC). 
 The current short range radars include the ASR-8 
(AN/GPN-20), ASR-9, and ASR-11 (AN/GPN-30). 
 The ASR-9 incorporates the Weather Systems Processor 
(WSP).  
 ASR-11 (AN/GPN-30) S-Band and Mobile ASR S-
Band: is the newest and has replaced several of the radars 
that were not replaced by an earlier ASR-9 program. The 
ASR-11 contains its own beacon system, known as the 
MSSR (Monopulse Secondary Surveillance Radar). 
 The Mobile Airport Surveillance Radar (MASR): is a 
terminal surveillance radar that can be moved from site 
to site to support radar relocations, temporary planned 
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outages of an existing radar for installation of upgrades, 
and emergency operations when existing systems are 
damaged. [1] 
Long range radar surveillance systems: The FAA has 
developed and deployed an increasing more capable series of 
long range radars designated as ARSR (Air Route 
Surveillance Radars). The military has deployed a derivative 
series of radars designated by AN/FPS. The ARSRs include 
weather monitoring. 
 The ARSR-4 is the only FAA en route radar with three 
dimensional (3D) capabilities. 
 The military long range radars are modified versions of 
the same AN/FPS-20 series radar system. 
Secondary Surveillance RADAR (SSR) Systems 
The purpose of SSR is to improve the ability to detect and 
identify aircraft while automatically providing the Flight 
Level (pressure altitude) of an aircraft. An SSR ground 
station transmits interrogation pulses. An aircraft transponder 
within line-of-sight range 'listens' for the SSR interrogation 
signal and transmits a reply that provides aircraft information. 
The reply sent depends on the interrogation mode. The 
aircraft is displayed as a tagged icon on the controller’s radar 
screen at the measured bearing and range. An aircraft without 
an operating transponder still may be observed by primary 
radar, but would be displayed to the controller without the 
benefit of SSR derived data. 
The FAA has developed and deployed an increasing more 
capable series of secondary radars designated as ATCBI (Air 
Traffic Control Beacon Interrogator). The deployed versions 
today include the ATCBI-4/5/6. 
 The ATCBI-6 includes a secure military Identify Friend 
or Foe (IFF) function that allows it to distinguish 
between friendly aircraft and enemy aircraft. ATCBI-6 
improves system performance through the use of Mode-
S selective interrogation and monopulse technology. [2] 
 Mode-S - The Mode Select mechanism is a ground-based 
system capable of selective interrogation of Mode S 
transponders and general interrogation of Air Traffic 
Control Radar Beacon System (ATCRBS) transponders 
within range. The system also receives, processes, and 
forwards the transponder replies to appropriate air traffic 
control (ATC) automation systems. 
Additional Surveillance Technologies 
The following sections summarize additional types of 
surveillance systems and technologies. 
Tethered Aerostat Radar System (TARS) 
Tethered Aerostat Radar Systems are surveillance systems in 
which the radar is not on the ground, but attached to a tethered 
helium balloon, shaped like a blimp, that can be stationed 
above a ground site up to 15,000 feet above the ground, or 
tethered to a ship. They have been used for 75 years and the 
most recent use is by Customs and Border Protection along 
the US southern border for drug interdiction and illegal 
immigration. TARS radar is the Lockheed Martin L88 wide 
area surveillance radar with a range of 200 nm. It is used 
primarily for detecting motion on the surface. Additionally, 
449 MHz wind profiler radars have been mounted to 
aerostats. [3] 
Terminal Doppler Weather Radar 
Terminal Doppler Weather Radar (TDWR) is C-Band system 
used in Air Traffic Control (ATC) to monitor incoming 
weather and warns air traffic controllers of gust fronts, wind 
shear and microburst. There are 47 commissioned systems in 
operation today. The first system was commissioned in 1993. 
NEXRAD (WSR-88D) 
The Next Generation Radar (Nexrad) is an S-band, long-
range weather radar used by the National Weather Service 
(NWS) and the FAA. The FAA uses this radar to monitor 
weather in the en route (long range) environment. There are 
155 NEXRAD systems owned by the NWS and 12 FAA 
offshore systems located in Alaska, Hawaii and the Virgin 
Islands. The FAA systems are unique by having dual 
transmitters increasing reliability. 
Airport Surface Detection 
Airport surface surveillance systems include the ASDE-X 
system which is widely deployed today and its replacement, 
the ASSC system. 
 ASDE-X (Airport Surface Detection Equipment Model 
X): A runway safety tool providing airport surface 
surveillance of aircraft and ground vehicles on the 
movement area for use in air traffic controller displays, 
especially valuable during darkness and periods of poor 
visibility. ADSE-X replaces earlier generation surface 
detection equipment known as ASDE-3 that used 
primary radar from a tower mounted antenna to detect 
and display targets on the airport surface. ASDE-X uses 
transponder returns in addition to primary radar to detect 
and track targets, providing identification in addition to 
target location. The ASDE-X interrogators use 
multilateration that pinpoints the location of the 
transponder returns by ranging to the aircraft from the 
multiple locations and solving the geometry where the 
range arcs intersect. The ASDE-X sites also contain 
ADS-B receivers to receive these signals from equipped 
aircraft, and merge the returns to display a single target 
per aircraft or ground vehicle. 
 ASSC (Airport Surface Surveillance Capability): The 
next generation of surface detection equipment. The 
ASSC system receives input from ASDE-3 surface 
movement radar, ASSC multilateration remote units, 
ADS-B, Airport Surveillance Radar/Mode-S, and 
Terminal automation for the flight plan data. ASSC fuses 
this data to produce a highly accurate display for 
controllers to show aircraft and ground vehicles on the 
surface movement area, and on arrival and departure 
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routes. Pilots with TIS-B and cockpit displays can also 
receive ASSC data. ASSC data is also transmitted to 
other FAA systems, including ADS-B, SWIM, and 
Runway Status Lights. [4] 
Multilateration 
Multilateration is the same SSR ranging technique used in 
ASDE-X, but applied over a wide area instead of just an 
airport surface. It is used primarily in mountainous areas 
where radar has difficulty seeing targets behind the 
mountains. If the target can be seen by enough ground 
stations, the technique can be used to solve for altitude as well 
as horizontal position, but the altitude information contained 
in the aircraft transponder return is used to improve the height 
resolution. Used widely in Europe, the FAA has only fielded 
this service in the mountainous area of western Colorado to 
provide radar services to aircraft using the airports in the ski 
resort country. This is called the Colorado Wide Area 
Multilateration (WAM) system. 
Inductive Loop Detectors 
The inductive loop detector (ILD) is the most common sensor 
used in traffic management applications. Its size and shape 
vary, including the 5-ft by 5-ft or 6-ft by 6-ft square loops, 6-
ft diameter round loops, and rectangular configurations 
having a 6-ft width and variable length. The principal 
components of an inductive loop detector include: one or 
more turns of insulated wire buried in a shallow saw-cut in 
the roadway, a lead-in cable that runs from a roadside pull 
box to the controller cabinet, and an electronics unit located 
in the controller cabinet. 
The wire loop is excited with signals whose frequencies range 
from 10 KHz to 50 KHz and functions as an inductive 
element in conjunction with the electronics unit. When a 
vehicle stops on or passes over the loop, the inductance of the 
loop is decreased. The decreased inductance increases the 
oscillation frequency and causes the electronics unit to send 
a pulse to the controller, indicating the presence or passage of 
a vehicle. [5] 
Aircraft-installed Surveillance Technologies 
ADS-B (Automatic Dependent Surveillance). A system 
which sends aircraft position derived on board to a ground 
control system for use in Air Traffic Control. ADS-B uses 
GPS as the position source, broadcasting to ATC ground 
stations and other nearby aircraft once a second. This 
broadcast contains the position, altitude, identity and velocity 
vector of the reporting aircraft. Aircraft broadcast ADS-B 
messages on the 1090 MHz frequency if above FL 180 and 
may use the frequency 978 MHz, known as the Universal 
Access Transceiver (UAT), below FL 180. 
Aireon. In an effort to support basic radar services 
worldwide, the Aireon company has put ADS-B transponders 
on latest Iridium Next satellites in low earth orbit that can 
receive ADS-B transmissions from aircraft and send them to 
the appropriate ground ATC facility anywhere in the world. 
As oceanic separation standards are much larger than 
domestic (fifty to one hundred miles vs. three to five miles) 
the ADS-B messages do not all have to be forwarded, instead 
only every eight seconds (with a latency of two seconds) to 
support reducing separation to 10 miles. Also, Aireon’s data 
is encrypted so it is likely to be among the most secure of 
surveillance sources. Air traffic service providers (ANSPs) in 
several parts of the world have already signed up to use the 
service and the FAA has it under consideration for use in the 
Atlantic and Pacific Flight Information Regions in which 
they provide the air traffic services. 
TCAS (Traffic Collision Avoidance System). Air to air active 
surveillance of the transponders on other aircraft was 
developed beginning in the 1970's and formally called for by 
the FAA administrator in 1981. Standards for the electronics' 
signal in space and the avoidance logic to ensure cooperative 
resolutions were developed in RTCA Special Committee 
147. Congress required the system by law, followed up by 
FAA rulemaking that all aircraft in the US with 31 or more 
seats would have to install and operate TCAS by 1993. 
Collisions involving equipped aircraft subsequently ceased 
except for one notable exception in Europe in which the 
TCAS Resolution Advisory was deliberately ignored by one 
of the pilots involved in favor of the controller's instructions. 
There is a movement to incorporate ADS-B IN surveillance 
into TCAS to improve upon the accuracy of the encounter 
geometry available to the avoidance logic. There are also 
many who believe that large UAs should carry TCAS even 
though they would not be required to under the seat rule. 
Air to Air radars. Historically, air to air radar has been a 
special purpose tool largely limited to military operations. It 
has been very expensive, heavy, with limited performance 
and high-power requirements. Most airborne radars do not 
scan completely around the aircraft, rather in a fairly narrow 
field of view to the front. The requirement for UAs to perform 
an equivalent "see and avoid" function to the manned aircraft 
requirement brought renewed interest in the use of airborne 
radar for surveillance of non-cooperative targets.  
In the past, aircraft-installed C-Band weather radars were 
quite adept at picking up other aircraft in their scan. Because 
non-cooperative targets don't report their altitude, this 
sensitive parameter must be gleaned from the elevation angle 
of the return and the range to the target, so the local horizontal 
must be accurately known even during maneuvering. One 
idea being examined is to integrate airborne radar with an 
electro-optical/IR sensor. The radar is very accurate in range 
but not in azimuth. Electro-optical sensors (cameras) are the 
opposite, accurate in azimuth but no clue about range without 
time consuming tracking and processing. Integrating the two 
concepts might produce a viable surveillance device at least 
for use in good visibility conditions 
Future Surveillance Technologies 
Ground Based Sense and Avoid (GBSAA) RADARs. A 
number of concepts are being explored for non-cooperative 
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detection of UAS. The FAA and the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) conducted drone-detection 
research in the vicinity of Denver International Airport. This 
work is part of the FAA’s Pathfinder Program for UAS 
Detection at Airports and Critical Infrastructure. The work in 
Denver is one of six technical evaluations. Industry partners 
involved in the Denver flights included CACI International, 
Liteye Systems and Sensofusion. Other evaluation sites 
include Atlantic City International Airport, JFK International 
Airport, Eglin Air Force Base, Helsinki Airport, and Dallas-
Ft. Worth International Airport. In addition to DHS, the 
FAA’s federal research partners include the Department of 
Defense, FBI, Federal Communications Commission, 
Department of the Interior, Department of Energy, NASA, 
Department of Justice, Bureau of Prisons, US Secret Service 
and US. [6] 
SSRC has produced a family of radar systems designed for 
GBSAA named “LSTAR” ground sensors. The LSTAR is 
certified to DO-178 standards, produces 360-degree coverage 
with a range of 50 KM and is advertised to detect low 
reflectivity targets like hang gliders. It is “small, 
transportable, can cue a visible light or IR camera and can be 
integrated with ADS-B or SSR data.” The systems are being 
evaluated at Dallas Fort Worth (DFW) by the FAA. 
In a system test run at Cannon Air Force Base in New 
Mexico, a modified STARS automation system was used, 
including primary radar data to track the non-cooperative 
targets. [7] The U.S. Army installed its first Ground-Based 
Sense-and-Avoid radar system at Fort Hood, which is home 
to two MQ-1C Gray Eagle unmanned aircraft system 
companies, in December 2014. Fort Hood is one of five 
installations that have been identified to acquire the system. 
[8] 
Spectrum Efficient National Surveillance RADAR (SENSR) 
Program. SENSR is currently slated to replace many, if not 
all, distinct site configurations of legacy surveillance 
systems. 
A DoD, DHS, DOT/FAA, DOC/NWS (NOAA) cross-agency 
program titled Spectrum Efficient National Surveillance 
Radar (SENSR) has been initiated and is seeking to make 
available a minimum of 30 MHz in the 1300 – 1350 MHz 
band for reallocation to shared Federal and non-Federal use 
by updating some or all of the legacy surveillance 
technologies. This multi- agency program led by the FAA is 
specifically targeted at vacating federally-used spectrum in 
the L-band to make available that 30MHz for auction to 
commercial spectrum users. This auction is estimated to 
produce nearly $50Billion in revenue to the federal 
government and is slated to reimburse the cost of updating 
and relocating legacy systems in that band to function in 
another available spectrum as well as update/modernize 
aging cooperative and non-cooperative surveillance systems 
supporting air traffic control, homeland security, air defense, 
and weather prediction capabilities required by key U.S. 
Federal agencies 
LTE location systems. LTE has Location Based Services 
(LBS) written into the LTE specification. The services are 
rapidly improving with each generation of LTE technology. 
The benefit of LTE LBS is to supplement GPS in 
environments where obstructions interfere with GPS signals, 
e.g. urban environments. LTE LBS allow surveillance of all 
LTE enabled entities. The LTE LBS infrastructure is already 
in place and is expanding and improving continuously as LTE 
providers invest in their networks and network services. [9] 
Location Based Services (LBS) is already well established, 
using the location of the mobile device for both emergency 
services (E911,) and infotainment (map services, directions 
to a chosen location, local advertising/information and “find 
a friend”). So far, this is just the beginning for LBS; the 
increasing sophistication of the smart phone, high-speed data 
rates with LTE, and consumer demand for ‘always-on’ 
interaction mean that LBS applications are going to expand 
massively over the coming years. 
Electro Optical systems. Electro optical systems (cameras) 
are a common sensor on UAS and are an evolving option for 
both UAS detect and avoid (DAA) and for navigation during 
day light hours. The DAA application, like air to air radars, 
can notionally detect and monitor non-cooperative vehicles 
within EO range of the EO sensor, acting as pilot eyes in the 
UAS. Range is a function of EO optics, atmospheric 
conditions, and lighting. EO sensors are passive, i.e. they do 
not transmit, so spectrum use is not an issue. 
Infrared (IR) systems. Infrared systems (thermal cameras) are 
a common sensor on UAS and are an evolving option for both 
UAS detect and avoid (DAA) and for navigation during night 
time hours. The DAA application, like air to air radars, can 
notionally detect and monitor non-cooperative vehicles 
within IR range of the IR sensor. Range is a function of IR 
optics, atmospheric conditions, and target heat signature. IR 
sensors are passive, i.e., they do not transmit, so spectrum use 
is not an issue. 
Millimeter Wave (MM). Millimeter Wave (MMW) radars are 
currently used as range measuring devices in applications 
such as automotive driving aids, the mapping of mines, and 
autonomous field robotics. This recent interest is largely due 
to the advantages MMW radars offer over other range 
measuring sensors, as their performance is less affected by 
dust, fog, rain or snow and ambient lighting conditions. 
MMW radars can provide received signal strength values, at 
all discrete range intervals, within the working range of the 
radar. The received power versus range spectra hence contain 
useful range to target information, but are also corrupted by 
noise. User defined stochastic algorithms can then be 
implemented, which exploit this rich data to improve object 
detection and mapping performance. This is in contrast to 
many other range measuring devices which typically 
internally threshold received signals, to provide single hard 
decisions only, on the estimated range to objects. 
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Light Detection and Ranging (LIDAR). LIDAR iIs a remote 
sensing method that uses light in the form of a pulsed laser to 
measure ranges (variable distances) to the earth. These light 
pulses—combined with other data recorded by the airborne 
system— generate precise, three-dimensional information 
about the shape of the Earth and its surface characteristics. 
[11] 
A LIDAR instrument principally consists of a laser, a 
scanner, and a specialized GPS receiver. Airplanes and 
helicopters are the most commonly used platforms for 
acquiring LIDAR data over broad areas. 
Most self-driving vehicles use LIDAR to map physical space 
by bouncing laser beams off of objects. But as we’ve reported 
recently, the autonomy boom means that suppliers of the 
once-niche hardware are struggling to keep up with demand. 
Even companies that have developed in-house alternatives 
are having trouble: Uber and Waymo are currently embroiled 
in a lawsuit over the intellectual property relating to their 
homegrown hardware. [12] 
Typically, a LIDAR rig is the most distinctive part of a self-
driving car: it looks like an oversize coffee can mounted on 
the car’s roof, whirling around as it spits out laser pulses. And 
the most commonly spotted sensors are made by Velodyne, 
whose top-end devices cost tens of thousands of dollars. 
Real-time locating systems (RTLS). Real-time locating 
systems (RTLS) are used to automatically identify and track 
the location of objects or people in real time, usually within 
a building or other contained area. Wireless RTLS tags are 
attached to objects or worn by people, and in most RTLS, 
fixed reference points receive wireless signals from tags to 
determine their location. Examples of real-time locating 
systems include tracking automobiles through an assembly 
line, locating pallets of merchandise in a warehouse, or 
finding medical equipment in a hospital. 
The physical layer of RTLS technology is usually some form 
of radio frequency (RF) communication, but some systems 
use optical (usually infrared) or acoustic (usually ultrasound) 
technology instead of or in addition to RF. Tags and fixed 
reference points can be transmitters, receivers, or both, 
resulting in numerous possible technology combinations. 
RTLS are a form of local positioning system, and do not 
usually refer to GPS or to mobile phone tracking. Location 
information usually does not include speed, direction, or 
spatial orientation. 
Ultrasonic detection systems.   Ultrasonic sensors transmit 
pressure waves of sound energy at a frequency between 25 
and 50 KHz, which are above the human audible range. Most 
ultrasonic sensors operate with pulse waveforms and provide 
vehicle count, presence, and occupancy information. Pulse 
waveforms measure distances to the road surface and vehicle 
surface by detecting the portion of the transmitted energy that 
is reflected towards the sensor from an area defined by the 
transmitter s beam width. When a distance other than that to 
the background road surface is measured, the sensor 
interprets that measurement as the presence of a vehicle. The 
received ultrasonic energy is converted into electrical energy 
that is analyzed by signal processing electronics that is either 
collocated with the transducer or placed in a roadside 
controller. 
Virtual Radars. Encompasses a concept to collect, aggregate, 
and synthesize ground-installed and aircraft-installed 
surveillance and DAA information, to distribute to UAS 
operators, ATC, and the broader aviation community. The 
concept also envisions crowd sourcing UA DAA data, UA 
weather data, non-aviation security data, and non-aviation 
weather data (especially applicable to micro weather). 
 
4. ARCHITECTURAL ALTERNATIVES 
The system architecture is designed to accomplish the 
following objectives: 
 Collect and “Fuse” aircraft data from many different data 
sources. 
 Collect airspace data from various sources. 
 Detect aircraft-to-aircraft conflicts and/or anomalous 
behavior. 
 Detect aircraft-to-environmental conflicts. 
 Provide service users with several avenues for receiving 
and viewing the aircraft data and/or alerts. 
The system is comprised of several components which, 
working together, accomplish the above stated objectives, see 
Figure 1. The system is flexible enough to be located at a 
single facility, hosted in the cloud, or to be distributed 
between several sites, including a cloud hosting service.
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Figure 1. System Architecture
Aircraft Data Fusing and Conflict Detection 
The first three sets of components (colored in blue in the 
System Architecture diagram) are responsible for handling 
the processing the aircraft data. These components are the 
Aircraft Data Fuser, the Active Aircraft Provider, and the 
Aircraft-to-Aircraft Conflict Detector. 
The Aircraft Data Fuser (ADF) collects data from many 
different sources (see External UAV Aircraft Data sources 
colored in gray in the System Architecture diagram) and 
fuses/merges all of this data into unique aircraft objects. 
Because aircraft IDs, if even available from the data source, 
will be different between the sources. Therefore, it is the 
ADF’s job to correlate the various aircraft reports using all 
of the available data (geographic, time, aircraft type, 
performance, etc.) and to then provide the rest of the 
system with a global unique flight id (GUFI) for each 
flight. The uniquely identified flights and information are 
then passed onto the Active Aircraft Provider. 
The Active Aircraft Provider (AAP) receives flight records 
from the ADF, updates the flight state of its internal list of 
flights, and provides an update notice to any components 
listening for flight updates: the Aircraft-to-Aircraft 
Conflict Detection component, the Aircraft-to-Structure 
Conflict Detection component, and the Subscription 
Services component. 
The Aircraft-to-Aircraft Conflict Detection (AADC) 
component performs conflict detection calculations 
whenever it receives flight updates from the AAP. It 
utilizes the current aircraft position reports, estimates of 
direction and speed, and updates to internal models to 
determine if any aircraft will be entering a conflict state 
with other aircraft, and if so, to flag the aircraft and send 
out alerts to the Subscription Services. Additionally, the 
AADC can examine an aircraft’s state against planned 
routes (if available) and provide notifications and/or alerts 
to the Subscription Service for aircraft deviations from its 
plan. 
Airspace Structure Data and Conflict Detection 
The second set of components (colored in purple in the 
System Architecture Diagram) are responsible for 
processing environmental and airspace data and in making 
sure that aircraft are in compliance with any regulations, 
restrictions, or safety factors expressed by the airspace 
data. 
The Airspace Structure Provider (ASP) collects airspace 
and environmental data from various data sources (see 
External NAS Structure Data in gray in the System 
Architecture diagram), performs any needed pre or post 
data processing on the data, and then stores/updates the 
airspace structure data in its internal list of active (or soon 
to be active) structures. After any new additions or updates, 
the component updates any other listener components of 
the changes: namely the Aircraft-to-Structure Conflict 
Detector. 
The Aircraft-to-Structure Conflict Detector (ASCD) 
performs a job similar to the Aircraft-to-Aircraft detector; 
however, it is interested in making sure that aircraft are in 
full compliance of any airspace restrictions or regulations 
through which they are traversing. If any aircraft is found 
to be non-compliant, that flight is flagged and an alert is 
sent out to the Subscription Service. 
Subscription Services 
The third and last set of components is the Subscription 
Services component. This component receives aircraft 
information from the Active Aircraft Provider and alerts 
and notifications from the Aircraft-to-Aircraft and 
Aircraft-to-Structure Conflict Detectors. The job of this 
component is to provide this aircraft data and information 
to external clients through multiple portals. Simple portals 
consist of short SMS messages or e-mail updated to notify 
clients of any important updates or alerts. A more advanced 
portal consists of a virtual radar covering regions of the 
NAS that can be viewed from a web browser, allowing 
clients to see not only their aircraft, but other aircraft and 
airspace structure that are active in their area of operation. 
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UAS Integration into Terminal areas with GBSAA 
The proliferation of unmanned aircraft (UAS) into the NAS 
has raised safety concerns for the FAA. UAS introduction 
increases the number of vehicle in the airspace. The UAS 
when compared to manned aircraft are often small and hard 
to ‘see,’ possess different performance characteristics, 
often fly unique mission profiles, carry fewer and less 
capable avionics and sensors for maintaining safe 
separation, and operate out-of-sight of the UAS operator 
who lacks an on the aircraft “see and avoid” capability.  
Federal regulation requires pilots to be aware of all other 
surrounding aircraft—either visually or using on-board 
instrumentation—and to safely avoid near-misses or 
collisions. Because there is no pilot physically onboard a 
UAS, remote operators must resort to limiting and 
sometimes impractical means of seeing and avoiding other 
aircraft, such as ground-based observers or chase aircraft 
behind the UAS.  
The aviation community has defined a limited scope Detect 
and Avoid (DAA) approach described by the RTCA SC-
228 DAA MOPS. However, the scope of the current RTCA 
DAA MOPS does not include operations in terminal areas. 
In today’s busier terminal areas, manned aircraft separation 
is achieved by ATC use of radar systems such as the ASR-
9 / ASR-11, ADS-B, and pilot “see and avoid” behaviors. 
The ASR radar systems are typically tuned to the faster and 
larger manned aircraft and cannot reliably detect UAS.  
To provide ATC and UAS operators see and avoid 
capabilities in the terminal area, the Air Force, the MITRE 
Corporation, Raytheon, the Volpe Center, members of the 
FAA, and many others have been developing a Ground 
Based Detect and Avoid (GBDAA) capability. The Air 
Force solution processes and fuses radar data from ASR 
terminal radars and from local GBSAA radars tuned to 
capture slow and small targets into a display that can 
provide ATC and UAS operators a detailed view of UAS 
and manned aircraft operations in the terminal area.  
The Air Force GBSAA solution is operational today at 
Cannon Air Force Base where it fulfills the FAA’s See and 
Avoid requirement (14CFR§91.113). The GBDAA system 
is designed to utilize existing ground-based radar 
infrastructures (ASR-9 and ASR-11) that work together 
with other small target ground-based radars (STARS, 
LSTAR, Sentinel) to provide operational personnel with 
situational awareness of the terminal airspace. The Airport 
Surveillance Radar (ASR) system allows operators to 
detect positions of cooperative aircraft, while the Standard 
Terminal Automation Replacement System (STARS), 
LSTAR, and Sentinel systems allow operators to filter out 
the airspace and detect non-cooperative aircraft. The 
position and movement of aircraft is indicated on a display, 
centered on the UAS, that a UAS operator can use to 
facilitate self-separation. This system implements a 
collision detection algorithm to alert an operator to an 
impending collision with another aircraft. Audible and 
visual alerts are presented to a UAS operator when a threat 
aircraft enters a pre-defined area around the UAS. If 
evasive action is required, additional alerts are provided to 
the pilot.  
The Cannon Air Force GBSAA system has obtained both 
an FAA Certificate of Authorization (COA) and an 
Airworthiness Military Flight Release (MFR) that allows 
UAS to transit to RAs through the NAS. From this 
certification case, many lessons were learned as to how to 
create and gain the rigorous approval from both the FAA 
and the Air Force. Since then, additional Air Force bases 
have initiated the process for establishing GBSAA 
systems. 
As shown in Figure 2, multiple flight operations are being 
performed. The GBDAA STARS screen is utilizing the 
fused data from the ASR-11, as well as its own algorithm 
sensors to provide a feed of all the aircraft flying in the 
terminal area. Before GBDAA, UAS missions would need 
to put up a Temporary Flight Restriction (TFR), in the 
terminal area, so they could take off without interruptions 
from other aircraft. Now, GBDAA system provides the 
UAS crew with surrounding aircraft positioning 
information so it can take evasive action, when necessary. 
It is then an easy step to envision that the same GBDAA 
produced aircraft positioning tracks being fed into a shared 
distribution service. In a sense, this would provide a virtual 
radar display for any UAS crew, in the operational area, to 
use as a means of detect. 
 
Figure 2. GBDAA concept to support terminal area 
UAS DAA. 
In the future, the fusion of a broad range of surveillance 
sources will create a Virtual Radar picture for situational 
awareness, enhancing both air and surface DAA, and 
enabling terminal see and avoid capabilities superior to that 
of manned aircraft. Figure 3 depicts a notional simplified 
view of surveillance sources and the consumers of the 
Virtual Radar situational awareness data. Various levels of 
processing may occur at the surveillance sources, the 
Virtual Radar, and by the consumers of the situational 
awareness data. ATC will have direct access to the NAS 
Systems and NAS Services, however the Virtual Radar 
inclusion of other sources may prove valuable to ATC. 
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Aviation stakeholders include, for example, facility 
managers requiring awareness of non-cooperative aircraft. 
The Virtual Radar system could be managed by a federal 
agency or by services created by one or more commercial 
enterprises. 
 
Figure 3. A notional view of virtual radar sources and 
consumers of the situational awareness data. 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has reviewed the future surveillance needs in 
the NAS, the diverse surveillance assets in the NAS, and 
candidate system architectural alternatives for using those 
surveillance assets to meet future needs. While investment 
and planning will be required to meet those needs, current 
and emerging surveillance technologies appear to be 
sufficient to meet those needs. 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
The authors offer their thanks to the U.S. Department of 
Transportation, the U.S. Department of Defense, and the 
U.S Air Force for their support in preparing this paper. 
 
DISCLAIMER 
The text and graphics within this paper express only the 
views and/or opinions of the authors as individuals and do 
not represent endorsements, commitments or polices of 
their firm, agency or organization. 
 
 
REFERENCES  
[1] FY 2018 FAA Capital Investment Plan, p. 45. 
[2] Regulus-group.com, 10-14-2017. 
[3] Tethered Aerostat Radar System, fas.org, (Federation 
of American Scientist), 10-14-2017. 
[4] “ADS-B / Airport Surface Surveillance Capability 
(ASSC),” faa.gov, 10-14-2017. 
[5] Surface Surveillance Industry Day Overview, FAA, 
June 15, 2017. 
[6] “FAA Evaluates Drone Detection Systems Around 
Denver,” faa.gov, November 2016. 
[7] “USAF validates Raytheon’s GBSAA radar 
capabilities,” airforce-technology.com, November 
2012. 
[8] “Army installs first Ground-Based Sense-and-Avoid 
radar,” army.mil, PEO Aviation, December 2014. 
[9] Mike Thorpe, M. Kottkamp, A. Rössler, J. Schütz., 
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